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Research related to:  Law/Regulation

The New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions

A new strand of research posits that migration restrictions could be not only desirably redistributive, but in fact globally efficient. This is the new economic case for migration restrictions. The case rests on the possibility that without tight restrictions on migration, migrants from poor countries could transmit low productivity (“A ” or Total Factor Productivity) to rich countries—offsetting efficiency gains from the spatial reallocation of labor from low to high-productivity places. We provide a novel assessment, proposing a simple model of dynamically efficient migration under productivity transmission and calibrating it with new macro and micro data.

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Michael Clemens & Lant Pritchett

Does the Globalization of Anti-corruption Law Help Developing Countries?

What role do foreign countries play in combating political corruption in developing countries? This chapter begins by describing the recently developed transnational anti-corruption regime, which encompasses legal instruments ranging from the dedicated multilateral agreements sponsored by the OECD and the United Nations, to the anti-corruption policies of the international financial institutions, to components of the international anti-money laundering regime, international norms governing government procurement, and private law norms concerning enforcement of corruptly procured contracts. It also surveys the evidence concerning a variety of claims about the potential advantages and disadvantages of having foreign institutions play a role in preventing, sanctioning, or providing redress for corruption on the part of local public officials . . . 
Kevin E. Davis

U.S. Environmental Regulation and FDI: Evidence from a Panel of U.S. Based Multinational Firms

This paper measures the response of U.S. based multinational firm to the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), which dramatically strengthened U.S. environmental regulation. Using a panel of firm-level data over the period 1966-1999, I estimate the effect of regulation on a multinational’s foreign production decisions. The CAAA induced substantial variation in the degree of regulation faced by firm, allowing for the estimation of econometric models that control for firm-specific characteristics and industrial trends. I find that the CAAA caused regulated multinational firm to increase their foreign assets by 5.3% and their foreign output by 9% . . .